feat(security): enforce elevated mode and sandbox execution

This commit is contained in:
William Valentin
2026-02-15 17:02:05 -08:00
parent b574d170d1
commit ab89378fce
4 changed files with 152 additions and 8 deletions
+42 -1
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@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ import type { ToolRegistry } from '../../tools/registry.js';
import type { ToolExecutor } from '../../tools/executor.js';
import type { ToolResult } from '../../tools/types.js';
import type { ToolPolicyContext } from '../../tools/policy.js';
import { auditLogger } from '../../audit/index.js';
import type { Attachment } from '../../channels/types.js';
import type { OutboundAttachmentCollector } from './attachments.js';
import { buildUserMessage, getMessageText } from '../../models/media.js';
@@ -266,8 +267,48 @@ export class NativeAgent {
const internalName = this.toolRegistry!.getByApiName(tc.name)?.name ?? tc.name;
this.onToolUse?.({ type: 'start', tool: internalName, args: tc.args });
let elevationUntilMs: number | undefined;
let elevationReason: string | undefined;
let elevationId: string | undefined;
if (this.session) {
const untilRaw = this.session.getConfig('elevation.until_ms');
const idRaw = this.session.getConfig('elevation.id');
const reasonRaw = this.session.getConfig('elevation.reason');
if (untilRaw && idRaw) {
const untilMs = Number.parseInt(untilRaw, 10);
if (Number.isFinite(untilMs)) {
const now = Date.now();
if (untilMs > now) {
elevationUntilMs = untilMs;
elevationId = idRaw;
elevationReason = reasonRaw ?? undefined;
} else {
// Auto-expire elevation.
this.session.deleteConfig('elevation.until_ms');
this.session.deleteConfig('elevation.reason');
this.session.deleteConfig('elevation.id');
auditLogger?.securityElevationExpired({
session_id: this.session.id,
channel: this._toolPolicyContext?.channel ?? 'unknown',
sender: this._toolPolicyContext?.sender ?? 'unknown',
elevation_id: idRaw,
until_ms: untilMs,
reason: reasonRaw ?? undefined,
});
}
}
}
}
const perCallContext: ToolPolicyContext | undefined = this._toolPolicyContext
? { ...this._toolPolicyContext, untrustedContent: untrustedContentSeen }
? {
...this._toolPolicyContext,
untrustedContent: untrustedContentSeen,
elevatedHostUntilMs: elevationUntilMs,
elevatedHostReason: elevationReason,
elevatedHostId: elevationId,
}
: undefined;
const result = await this.toolExecutor!.execute(internalName, tc.args, perCallContext);
+3
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@@ -107,6 +107,9 @@ export async function startDaemon(config: Config): Promise<DaemonContext> {
const { skillRegistry, skillInstaller } = initSkills(config, lifecycle);
const { agentConfigRegistry, agentRouter, sandboxManager } = await initAgents({ config, lifecycle });
// Ensure ToolExecutor can enforce sandbox execution at runtime.
toolExecutor.setSandboxManager(sandboxManager);
const modelRouter = createModelRouter(config);
const commandRegistry = new CommandRegistry();
registerBuiltinCommands(commandRegistry);
+64
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@@ -262,4 +262,68 @@ describe('ToolExecutor', () => {
expect(result.success).toBe(false);
expect(result.error).toContain('refusing to pass');
});
it('denies host high-risk tools for sandboxed skills unless elevation is active', async () => {
const registry = new ToolRegistry();
registry.register({
name: 'shell.exec',
description: 'shell',
inputSchema: { type: 'object', properties: {} },
execute: async () => ({ success: true, output: 'ok' }),
});
const hooks = new HookEngine({ confirm: [], log: [], silent: [] });
const executor = new ToolExecutor(registry, hooks);
const denied = await executor.execute('shell.exec', { command: 'echo hi' }, {
skillName: 'test-skill',
skillPermissions: { execution_environment: 'sandbox' },
executionEnvironment: 'host',
autonomyLevel: 'autonomous',
});
expect(denied.success).toBe(false);
expect(denied.error).toContain('execution_environment=host');
const allowedPromise = executor.execute('shell.exec', { command: 'echo hi' }, {
skillName: 'test-skill',
skillPermissions: { execution_environment: 'sandbox' },
executionEnvironment: 'host',
elevatedHostUntilMs: Date.now() + 60_000,
elevatedHostId: 'e1',
autonomyLevel: 'autonomous',
});
const pending = hooks.getPendingConfirmations();
expect(pending).toHaveLength(1);
hooks.resolveConfirmation(pending[0].id, { approved: true });
const allowed = await allowedPromise;
expect(allowed.success).toBe(true);
});
it('executes shell.exec in sandbox when executionEnvironment is sandbox', async () => {
const registry = new ToolRegistry();
registry.register({
name: 'shell.exec',
description: 'host shell',
inputSchema: { type: 'object', properties: {} },
execute: async () => { throw new Error('host should not run'); },
});
const hooks = new HookEngine({ confirm: [], log: [], silent: [] });
const executor = new ToolExecutor(registry, hooks);
const fakeSandbox = {
exec: async () => ({ stdout: 'sandbox-out', stderr: '' }),
} as any;
const fakeManager = {
getOrCreate: async () => fakeSandbox,
} as any;
executor.setSandboxManager(fakeManager);
const result = await executor.execute('shell.exec', { command: 'echo hi' }, {
executionEnvironment: 'sandbox',
sessionId: 's1',
autonomyLevel: 'autonomous',
});
expect(result.success).toBe(true);
expect(result.output).toContain('sandbox-out');
});
});
+43 -7
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@@ -7,6 +7,8 @@ import { auditLogger } from '../audit/index.js';
import { randomUUID } from 'crypto';
import { matchesAnyPattern, patternToRegex } from './policy.js';
import { redactForAudit, containsSecretLikeKeys } from '../audit/redact.js';
import type { SandboxManager } from '../sandbox/index.js';
import { createSandboxedProcessStartTool, createSandboxedShellTool } from '../sandbox/index.js';
export interface ToolExecutorConfig {
defaultTimeoutMs?: number;
@@ -18,6 +20,7 @@ export class ToolExecutor {
private hooks: HookEngine;
private defaultTimeoutMs: number;
private maxOutputBytes: number;
private sandboxManager?: SandboxManager;
constructor(registry: ToolRegistry, hooks: HookEngine, config?: ToolExecutorConfig) {
this.registry = registry;
@@ -26,9 +29,26 @@ export class ToolExecutor {
this.maxOutputBytes = config?.maxOutputBytes ?? 51_200;
}
setSandboxManager(manager?: SandboxManager): void {
this.sandboxManager = manager;
}
private isElevationActive(context?: ToolPolicyContext): boolean {
const untilMs = context?.elevatedHostUntilMs;
return typeof untilMs === 'number' && Number.isFinite(untilMs) && untilMs > Date.now();
}
private resolveEffectiveExecutionEnvironment(toolName: string, context?: ToolPolicyContext): 'host' | 'sandbox' {
const base = context?.executionEnvironment ?? 'host';
if (this.isHighRiskTool(toolName) && this.isElevationActive(context)) {
return 'host';
}
return base;
}
async execute(toolName: string, args: unknown, context?: ToolPolicyContext): Promise<ToolResult> {
const executionId = randomUUID();
const executionEnvironment = context?.executionEnvironment;
const executionEnvironment = this.resolveEffectiveExecutionEnvironment(toolName, context);
const skillName = context?.skillName;
const tool = this.registry.getByApiName(toolName);
@@ -69,7 +89,7 @@ export class ToolExecutor {
}
// Capability enforcement: filesystem + network constraints
const capabilityViolation = this.checkCapabilityConstraints(tool.name, args, context);
const capabilityViolation = this.checkCapabilityConstraints(tool.name, args, context, executionEnvironment);
if (capabilityViolation) {
auditLogger?.toolDenied({
tool_name: tool.name,
@@ -127,7 +147,12 @@ export class ToolExecutor {
const baseAction = this.hooks.getAction(toolName);
const autonomyLevel = context?.autonomyLevel ?? 'standard';
const autonomyDecision = resolveAutonomy(toolName, baseAction, autonomyLevel);
const finalAction = autonomyDecision.action;
let finalAction = autonomyDecision.action;
// Elevated mode must always require explicit confirmation for host high-risk tool calls.
if (executionEnvironment === 'host' && this.isHighRiskTool(toolName) && this.isElevationActive(context)) {
finalAction = 'confirm';
}
// Log autonomy override if applicable
if (autonomyDecision.overridden) {
@@ -201,7 +226,19 @@ export class ToolExecutor {
try {
const result = await Promise.race([
tool.execute(args),
(async () => {
if (executionEnvironment === 'sandbox' && this.sandboxManager) {
const sandboxSessionId = context?.sessionId ?? `${context?.channel ?? 'unknown'}:${context?.sender ?? 'unknown'}`;
const sandbox = await this.sandboxManager.getOrCreate(sandboxSessionId);
if (toolName === 'shell.exec') {
return createSandboxedShellTool(sandbox).execute(args);
}
if (toolName === 'process.start') {
return createSandboxedProcessStartTool(sandbox).execute(args);
}
}
return tool.execute(args);
})(),
new Promise<ToolResult>((_, reject) =>
setTimeout(() => reject(new Error(`Tool '${toolName}' timed out after ${this.defaultTimeoutMs}ms`)), this.defaultTimeoutMs),
),
@@ -286,7 +323,7 @@ export class ToolExecutor {
].includes(toolName);
}
private checkCapabilityConstraints(toolName: string, args: unknown, context?: ToolPolicyContext): string | null {
private checkCapabilityConstraints(toolName: string, args: unknown, context: ToolPolicyContext | undefined, effectiveEnv: 'host' | 'sandbox'): string | null {
const perms = context?.skillPermissions;
if (!perms) {
if (context?.skillName && this.isHighRiskTool(toolName)) {
@@ -297,9 +334,8 @@ export class ToolExecutor {
// Sandbox enforcement for high-risk tools unless explicitly allowed.
if (this.isHighRiskTool(toolName)) {
const env = context?.executionEnvironment ?? 'host';
const requested = perms.execution_environment ?? 'sandbox';
if (context?.skillName && env === 'host' && requested !== 'host') {
if (context?.skillName && effectiveEnv === 'host' && requested !== 'host' && !this.isElevationActive(context)) {
return 'high-risk tool execution on host is not allowed for this skill (requires execution_environment=host)';
}
}