# Agent-Oriented Project Diagram This is a high-signal, agent-oriented view of Flynn's structure and execution flow. If you're new to the codebase, start here, then jump to the referenced files. ## Big Picture (Runtime Data Flow) ```text Inbound Message (Telegram/Discord/Slack/WhatsApp/WebChat) | v ChannelAdapter -> ChannelRegistry | | | v | createMessageRouter() | | | v | SessionManager | | | v | AgentOrchestrator | | | v | NativeAgent | | | ModelRouter.chat() | | | v | ModelClient | +----> (optional) PairingManager gate for unknown senders Tool Calls (inside NativeAgent loop) NativeAgent -> ToolRegistry (policy-filtered) -> ToolExecutor | | | v | HookEngine + autonomy | | | v | Tool.execute() | | | v +---------------------------> AuditLogger (redacted) Outbound Reply -> ChannelAdapter.send() (text + optional attachments) ``` Key files: - Routing + per-session agent creation: `src/daemon/routing.ts` - Orchestration: `src/backends/native/orchestrator.ts` - Tool loop: `src/backends/native/agent.ts` - Model routing: `src/models/router.ts` - Tool policy + execution: `src/tools/policy.ts`, `src/tools/executor.ts` ## Component Graph (Agent-Safety Boundary) ```text +---------------------------+ | Config | | (Zod schema + YAML) | | src/config/schema.ts | +-------------+-------------+ | v +-------------------+ +-------------+ +------------------+ | SkillRegistry | | ToolPolicy | | HookEngine | | src/skills/* | | src/tools/* | | src/hooks/* | +---------+---------+ +------+------+ +---------+--------+ | | | | (system prompt) | (allow/deny) | (confirm/log/silent) v v v +-------------------+ +-------------+ +------------------+ | System Prompt | | ToolRegistry| | ToolExecutor | | src/daemon/services.ts| src/tools/* | | src/tools/executor.ts +---------+---------+ +------+------+ +---------+--------+ | | | v | | +-------------------+ | v | AgentOrchestrator | | +-----------+ | src/backends/* | +------------> | AuditLogger| +---------+---------+ | src/audit/*| | v +-------------------+ | NativeAgent | | src/backends/* | +---------+---------+ | v +-------------------+ | ModelRouter | | src/models/* | +-------------------+ ``` ## Skills + Capabilities (What Gets Enforced) Skills are local directories with: - `SKILL.md` (instructions injected into the system prompt) - `manifest.json` (metadata + optional `permissions`) ### Skill permissions enforcement points - Tool availability: `ToolPolicy.resolveAllowedNames()` intersects allowed tools with `manifest.json.permissions`. - Tool execution (defense in depth): `ToolExecutor.execute()` enforces: - fs allowlists (`permissions.fs.read` / `permissions.fs.write`) - net allowlists (best-effort for `web.fetch`) - secret scopes (tools declare `requiredSecretScopes`, skills allow `permissions.secrets`) - injection guard when untrusted content is present Important default: - If a request is routed into a skill context but the skill has no `permissions` manifest, **tool access is denied**. Key files: - Skill manifest types: `src/skills/types.ts` - Loader validation: `src/skills/loader.ts` - Policy intersection: `src/tools/policy.ts` - Executor enforcement: `src/tools/executor.ts` ## Sandbox Execution (High-Risk Tools) Flynn supports per-session Docker sandboxes. Where sandboxing is applied today: - `shell.exec` and `process.start` can be replaced with sandboxed implementations. - Replacement is wired in `src/daemon/routing.ts` by cloning the ToolRegistry and swapping the tool implementations. Skill context default: - High-risk tool execution defaults to `sandbox` in skill context (when available). - A skill can opt into host execution only by setting `permissions.execution_environment: "host"`. Key files: - Sandbox lifecycle: `src/sandbox/manager.ts`, `src/sandbox/docker.ts` - Sandboxed tool wrappers: `src/sandbox/tools.ts` - Wiring: `src/daemon/routing.ts` ## Prompt Injection Hardening (Practical) Flynn treats content provenance as part of the control boundary: - `web.fetch`, `web.search`, and `browser.content` outputs are treated as untrusted "fetched_content". - Tool results are wrapped in provenance markers inside the tool loop. - Once untrusted content is seen, ToolExecutor applies stricter gating (blocks obvious injection patterns for high-risk tools). Key files: - Provenance wrapping: `src/backends/native/agent.ts` - Tool-call guard: `src/tools/executor.ts` - System prompt safety guidance: `src/daemon/services.ts` ## Mermaid (For Fast Visual Scanning) If your renderer supports Mermaid, this is the same information as a sequence diagram. ```mermaid sequenceDiagram autonumber participant U as User participant CA as ChannelAdapter participant CR as ChannelRegistry participant SM as SessionManager participant AR as AgentOrchestrator participant NA as NativeAgent participant MR as ModelRouter participant MC as ModelClient participant TP as ToolPolicy/Registry participant TE as ToolExecutor participant HE as HookEngine participant AL as AuditLogger U->>CA: message CA->>CR: onMessage(InboundMessage) CR->>SM: getSession(channel, sender) SM-->>CR: Session CR->>AR: getOrCreateAgent(session + routing) AR->>NA: process(userMessage) NA->>MR: chat(messages + tools) MR->>MC: provider request MC-->>MR: response (content or tool_calls) MR-->>NA: ChatResponse alt model requests tool use NA->>TP: filtered tool list (skill + policy) NA->>TE: execute(tool, args, context) TE->>HE: confirm/log/silent (autonomy) HE-->>TE: approved/denied TE->>AL: audit (redacted) TE-->>NA: ToolResult NA->>MR: chat(tool_result blocks) end NA-->>AR: assistant response AR-->>CR: OutboundMessage CR-->>CA: send() CA-->>U: reply ```