- ansible/: VM provisioning playbooks and roles - provision-vm.yml: create KVM VM from Ubuntu cloud image - install.yml: install OpenClaw on guest (upstream) - customize.yml: swappiness, virtiofs fstab, linger - roles/vm/: libvirt domain XML, cloud-init templates - inventory.yml + host_vars/zap.yml: zap instance config - backup-openclaw-vm.sh: daily rsync + MinIO upload - restore-openclaw-vm.sh: full redeploy from scratch - README.md: full operational documentation Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
197 lines
4.6 KiB
Markdown
197 lines
4.6 KiB
Markdown
---
|
|
title: Security Architecture
|
|
description: Firewall configuration, Docker isolation, and security hardening details
|
|
---
|
|
|
|
# Security Architecture
|
|
|
|
## Overview
|
|
|
|
This playbook implements a multi-layer defense strategy to secure OpenClaw installations.
|
|
|
|
## Security Layers
|
|
|
|
### Layer 1: UFW Firewall
|
|
|
|
```bash
|
|
# Default policies
|
|
Incoming: DENY
|
|
Outgoing: ALLOW
|
|
Routed: DENY
|
|
|
|
# Allowed
|
|
SSH (22/tcp): ALLOW
|
|
Tailscale (41641/udp): ALLOW
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
### Layer 2: Fail2ban (SSH Protection)
|
|
|
|
Automatic protection against SSH brute-force attacks:
|
|
|
|
```bash
|
|
# Configuration
|
|
Max retries: 5 attempts
|
|
Ban time: 1 hour (3600 seconds)
|
|
Find time: 10 minutes (600 seconds)
|
|
|
|
# Check status
|
|
sudo fail2ban-client status sshd
|
|
|
|
# Unban an IP
|
|
sudo fail2ban-client set sshd unbanip IP_ADDRESS
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
### Layer 3: DOCKER-USER Chain
|
|
|
|
Custom iptables chain that prevents Docker from bypassing UFW:
|
|
|
|
```
|
|
*filter
|
|
:DOCKER-USER - [0:0]
|
|
-A DOCKER-USER -m conntrack --ctstate RELATED,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
|
|
-A DOCKER-USER -i lo -j ACCEPT
|
|
-A DOCKER-USER -i <default_interface> -j DROP
|
|
COMMIT
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
**Result**: Even `docker run -p 80:80 nginx` won't expose port 80 externally.
|
|
|
|
### Layer 4: Localhost-Only Binding
|
|
|
|
All container ports bind to 127.0.0.1:
|
|
|
|
```yaml
|
|
ports:
|
|
- "127.0.0.1:3000:3000"
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
### Layer 5: Non-Root Container
|
|
|
|
Container processes run as unprivileged `openclaw` user.
|
|
|
|
### Layer 6: Systemd Hardening
|
|
|
|
The openclaw service runs with security restrictions:
|
|
|
|
- `NoNewPrivileges=true` - Prevents privilege escalation
|
|
- `PrivateTmp=true` - Isolated /tmp directory
|
|
- `ProtectSystem=strict` - Read-only system directories
|
|
- `ProtectHome=read-only` - Limited home directory access
|
|
- `ReadWritePaths` - Only ~/.openclaw is writable
|
|
|
|
### Layer 7: Scoped Sudo Access
|
|
|
|
The openclaw user has limited sudo permissions (not full root):
|
|
|
|
```bash
|
|
# Allowed commands only:
|
|
- systemctl start/stop/restart/status openclaw
|
|
- systemctl daemon-reload
|
|
- tailscale commands
|
|
- journalctl for openclaw logs
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
### Layer 8: Automatic Security Updates
|
|
|
|
Unattended-upgrades is configured for automatic security patches:
|
|
|
|
```bash
|
|
# Check status
|
|
sudo unattended-upgrade --dry-run
|
|
|
|
# View logs
|
|
sudo cat /var/log/unattended-upgrades/unattended-upgrades.log
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
**Note**: Automatic reboots are disabled. Monitor for pending reboots:
|
|
```bash
|
|
cat /var/run/reboot-required 2>/dev/null || echo "No reboot required"
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
## Verification
|
|
|
|
```bash
|
|
# Check firewall
|
|
sudo ufw status verbose
|
|
|
|
# Check fail2ban
|
|
sudo fail2ban-client status
|
|
|
|
# Check Tailscale status
|
|
sudo tailscale status
|
|
|
|
# Check Docker isolation
|
|
sudo iptables -L DOCKER-USER -n -v
|
|
|
|
# Port scan from external machine (only SSH + Tailscale should be open)
|
|
nmap -p- YOUR_SERVER_IP
|
|
|
|
# Test container isolation
|
|
sudo docker run -d -p 80:80 --name test-nginx nginx
|
|
curl http://YOUR_SERVER_IP:80 # Should fail/timeout
|
|
curl http://localhost:80 # Should work
|
|
sudo docker rm -f test-nginx
|
|
|
|
# Check unattended-upgrades
|
|
sudo systemctl status unattended-upgrades
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
## Tailscale Access
|
|
|
|
OpenClaw's web interface (port 3000) is bound to localhost. Access it via:
|
|
|
|
1. **SSH tunnel**:
|
|
```bash
|
|
ssh -L 3000:localhost:3000 user@server
|
|
# Then browse to http://localhost:3000
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
2. **Tailscale** (recommended):
|
|
```bash
|
|
# On server: already done by playbook
|
|
sudo tailscale up
|
|
|
|
# From your machine:
|
|
# Browse to http://TAILSCALE_IP:3000
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
## Network Flow
|
|
|
|
```
|
|
Internet → UFW (SSH only) → fail2ban → DOCKER-USER Chain → DROP
|
|
Container → NAT → Internet (outbound allowed)
|
|
```
|
|
|
|
## Known Limitations
|
|
|
|
### macOS Support
|
|
- macOS firewall configuration is basic (Application Firewall only)
|
|
- No fail2ban equivalent on macOS
|
|
- Consider using Little Snitch or similar for enhanced macOS security
|
|
|
|
### IPv6
|
|
- Docker IPv6 is disabled by default (`ip6tables: false` in daemon.json)
|
|
- If your network uses IPv6, review and test firewall rules accordingly
|
|
|
|
### Installation Script
|
|
- The `curl | bash` installation pattern has inherent risks
|
|
- For high-security environments, clone the repository and audit before running
|
|
- Consider using `--check` mode first: `ansible-playbook playbook.yml --check`
|
|
|
|
## Security Checklist
|
|
|
|
After installation, verify:
|
|
|
|
- [ ] `sudo ufw status` shows only SSH and Tailscale allowed
|
|
- [ ] `sudo fail2ban-client status sshd` shows jail active
|
|
- [ ] `sudo iptables -L DOCKER-USER -n` shows DROP rule
|
|
- [ ] `nmap -p- YOUR_IP` from external shows only port 22
|
|
- [ ] `docker run -p 80:80 nginx` + `curl YOUR_IP:80` times out
|
|
- [ ] Tailscale access works for web UI
|
|
|
|
## Reporting Security Issues
|
|
|
|
If you discover a security vulnerability, please report it privately:
|
|
- OpenClaw: https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security
|
|
- This installer: https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw-ansible/security
|